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BOOK REVIEWS
THE GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS: SELECTED READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE.
Edited by Clarence Morris. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1959. Pp. 571. $10.00.
In most classes taught in law school the nature of the subject
matter keeps the choices to be made by the teacher with respect
to course content within relatively narrow bounds. This does not
hold true for the course dealing with the philosophy or general theory
of the law, usually offered under the name of Jurisprudence. In this
field it may easily happen that the contents of two courses taught by
different teachers are completely incongruous and do not touch each
other at a single point. One teacher may wish to give a survey of
the great political and social philosophies that have decisively influenced the historical development of the law; another may decide
to concentrate on the analysis of basic legal concepts of a technical
character which underlie his legal system or legal systems in
general. A third teacher may weave the course around one or two
classical works raising fundamental philosophical or ethical problems relevant to the law; and still another may prefer to introduce
his students to contemporary court decisions dealing with vital policy
issues of the day. So wide open is the choice of alternative avenues
of approach, so different the scope of coverage depending upon
whether the philosophical or sociological or historical or analyticalmethodical components of jurisprudence, or some combinations of
these, are accentuated by the instructor that it would be extremely
difficult to prepare a set of teaching materials in this field which
would meet with widespread acceptance.
The preferences of the author of the book under review concerning
desirable course content in Jurisprudence are clear and unmistakable.
His compilation is designed to acquaint the students with the work
and thoughts of a number of influential legal philosophers of ancient,
medieval, and modern vintage. Ancient and medieval philosophy
are represented by Aristotle, Cicero, and St. Thomas Aquinas. The
natural law philosophies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
are highlighted by a selection of thinkers exhibiting different versions
of the classical natural law doctrine. German transcendental idealism and English utilitarianism are fully covered in the volume.
Twentieth-century jurisprudence is represented by Holmes, Ehrlich,
Dabin, Dewey, Cardozo, and Pound.
In the opinion of this reviewer, the choice of authors made by
432
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Professor Morris is, on the whole, well considered and fully justifiable. There may be some quarrel perhaps about the question whether
some additional juridical thinkers of our own epoch should have
been included. Undoubtedly, considerations of reasonable size of the
book set definite limits to the editor's desire and discretion in this
respect. It might be argued, however, that John Dewey's main
accomplishments were in the field of general rather than legal philosophy (although his pragmatic approach has influenced contemporary
legal method to some extent), so that it might have been preferable to
substitute excerpts from one or two recent jurisprudential works
for his contribution.
The arrangement of Professor Morris' book is historical rather
than topical. The legal philosophers included are presented, by and
large, according to their sequence in time; substantial excerpts
from their writings dealing with a host of problems are given. The
consequence of this arrangement is that treatments of one and the
same problem by different thinkers are scattered through the volume
instead of being collected at one place under a topical heading. The
objection could be raised that this organization of the materials makes
it necessary for the teacher to jump across the board all the time
and tends to disrupt an integrated and concentrated consideration of
the great jurisprudential issues. This is an arguable point, but Professor Morris' approach has its compensatory advantages. It should
not be overlooked that the work of a great thinker forms a connected
whole, and that it is usually interesting and rewarding to discover
the links and cross-lines between different aspects of his thought,
such as the relationship between his psychology and his doctrine
of justice, or his sociological assumptions and his theory of government. If the contributions of a philosopher are split up into fragments and discussed in a disjointed fashion, it is difficult for the
student to obtain a full and clear view of the edifice of his thinking.
The excerpts presented by Professor Morris from the writings of
each philosopher are of considerable length. This is a great merit
of the book, for the work of a creative mind cannot be appraised by
merely absorbing little tidbits of his exposition. On the other hand,
the compilation suffers in this reviewer's opinion from the fact that
in many places discourses on some legal-philosophical problems have
been too heavily edited by the compiler. Sentences at the beginning,
middle, or end of a paragraph in the original text have frequently
been excised, and the flow of the argument has thereby been interrupted in a considerable number of places. This was undoubtedly
done to save space and eliminate repetition or rephrased statements
of the same point. Granting the legitimacy of this objective, the
technique nevertheless has its drawbacks. While it is without ques-
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tion appropriate to make a selection of problems discussed or arguments presented by a legal philosopher, the exposition of the problems
and arguments chosen should not be broken up by too much cutting
and pruning. This does violence to the literary and aesthetic component of an author's work. Using a comparison from the field of
art, it would seem to be entirely proper for the copyist of a painting
portraying several scenes or figures to confine his copywork to one
or two of the scenes or figures. But it would appear to offend against
the canons of proper reproduction to eliminate from the parts selected
some trees, pieces of furniture, or items of dress which the copyist
considers superfluous. While the fault is a slighter one in the case
of literary works, it may lead to interference with the enjoyment of
such works and make it hard for the reader to appreciate the style
of the writer and his technique of argumentation.
With this reservation, this instructor found the book a very adequate teaching tool. What is perhaps more important, his students
concurred in this judgment. Professor Morris has done a valuable
service to the law teaching profession and the interested public by
filling a gap in the instructional literature in the field of jurisprudence.
EDGAR BODENHEIMER*

LAW AS LARGE AS LIFE: A NATURAL LAW FOR TODAY AND THE SUPREME
COURT AS ITS PROPHET. By Charles P. Curtis. New York: Simon &

Schuster. 1959. $3.50.
The 1958 lectures of Judge Learned Hand at Harvard have become
the departure point for a large number of shrewd, scholarly reappraisals of the role of courts in our constitutional system. Undoubtedly
the forthright observations of the venerable judge, who has a penchant
for describing things as they are, have shocked a good many legal
minds into both thoughtful and subtle rejoinders. Among these an
article and a book make significant contributions to the current
literature dealing with the eternal problem of the supportable limits
of judicial legislation. The article is "Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law"' by Herbert Wechsler, Harlan Fiske Stone Professor of Constitutional Law at Columbia University. The book is
Law as Large as Life by Charles P. Curtis. The two provide the occasion and opportunity for this review.
* Professor of Law, University of Utah.
1. 73 IHAv. L. REv. 1 (1959).
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Since Judge Hand's lectures2 furnish the springboard for these
legalistic exercises, it is well to review briefly Hand's position. He does
not believe that the power of courts to set aside, as unconstitutional,
the acts of the two other coequal departments of government can be
found either expressly or implicitly in the language of the Constitution. Rather he thinks that the power developed out of necessity, as a
practical condition for the successful operation of the federal system.
He believes that, aside from keeping each of the departments and the
states within their respective spheres of activity, courts should intervene to modify or nullify the substance of legislative and executive
activity only on extreme occasions. Value choices are left under our
system to representative assemblies. Courts are poor instruments for
the achievement of social reform. He can find no definition that will
explain when the Supreme Court "will assume the role of a third
legislative chamber and when it will limit its authority to keeping
Congress and the states within their accredited authority." This
state of affairs, he thinks, imperils the judicial function and perverts
our system. For good or ill, Judge Hand discussed the segregation
decision as an example of the kind of judicial law-making in the
realm of value choices that he believed to be unwarranted by our
system.
Mr. Wechsler disagrees with Hand on the permissible limits of
judicial activity. He believes that the power and duty of judicial review is founded in the language of the Constitution and "is not a mere
interpolation." He draws much comfort from article VI, paragraph 2,
the supremacy clause, when supported by other relevant provisions of
the Constitution. He has "not the slightest doubt respecting the
legitimacy of judicial review, whether the action called in question in
a case which otherwise is proper for adjudication is legislative or
executive, federal or state."
While he accepts wholeheartedly the doctrine of judicial review,
Mr. Wechsler does insist that there are standards to be followed in
interpretation--criteria that may be framed and tested as "an exercise of reason" rather than an act of will. Accordingly, the limits of
judicial intervention are marked by reason rather than by will. The
judicial process, he insists, must be genuinely principled. To be so
principled decisions must be based on grounds of adequate neutrality
and generality. Judgments must be supported by reasoned explanations and embody principles capable of application beyond the cases
from which they emerge. The virtue of a judgment depends upon
the reasons that sustain it.
The reason for the failure of the "old Court," the pre-1937 Court,
2. These lectures, published as HAND,
viewed by Dean Lancaster last year. 67

THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958),
SEWANEE REV. 123 (1959).

were re-
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Wechsler believes, lies partly in its failure to articulate neutral and
principled decisions. In its attempts to use due process to freeze economic relationships and to contain the scope of national authority the
Court of the Thirties could not "present an adequate analysis, in terms
of neutral principle to support the value choices which it decreed."
But, if the old Court's weakness and impotence lay in its failure to
recognize the judicial virtues inherent in neutral principles of judicial
right reason, what may be the disposition of the present Court in respect to observing such judicial standards? Wechsler finds that in
several fields of adjudication the Court has been decreeing value
choices "in a way that makes it quite impossible to speak of principled
determinations or the statement and evaluation of judicial reasons."
In one field the Court evades its duty by per curiam decisions and in
another by failure to articulate and apply neatly and judiciously neutral legal principles. The crucial examples of this failure are those
cases involving the application of the fourteenth amendment to deprivations based on race, namely the white primary, the restrictive
covenant, and the school segregation cases. In Smith v. Allwright3
the Court ruled that the Democratic Party might not exclude from
its primary elections on racial grounds citizens otherwise eligible to
participate in the election process. This it did on the reasoning of
United States v. Classic4 that primaries are an integral part of the
elective process. Yet the ratio decidendi of Classic related not to party
membership but rather to deprivation by fraud. Classic provided no
neutral or reasoned principle for the decision in Smith v. Allwright,
overturning Grovey v. Townsend 5 which had left parties free to define their membership as private associations. The decision means,
says Wechsler, that the deprivation of the franchise on the ground of
race or color has become "a prohibition of party organization6 upon
racial lines, at least where the party has achieved political hegemony." Supposing that denial of the franchise on religious grounds
is constitutionally forbidden: Are religious parties to be proscribed?
wonders Wechsler. If so, by what stretch of constitutional analysis?
The restrictive covenant case7 presents to Mr. Wechsler an even
more glaring example of specious reasoning. Assuming that the Constitution forbids a state, but not an individual, to discriminate on
grounds of race, why is the enforcement of a private covenant which
restricts the sale of real estate on racial grounds--a valid covenant in
law-state action? That an agency of the state is a means of enforce3. 321U.S. 649 (1944).
4. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
5. 295 U.S. 45 (1935).

.6. Emphasis added.
7. Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 14 (1948).
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ment is not sufficient, for enforcement merely gives effect to a claim
recognized among others by the state to be a lawful one. Such decisions as this, Wechsler believes yield "no neutral principles for their
extension or support."
Finally, Mr. Wechsler comes to the school decision, which for him
"stirs the deepest conflict." The problem for him "inheres strictly in
the reasoning of the opinion." If it turns on the sufficiency of evidence
that separation harms the negro children involved, the evidence is
contradictory and judicially incomplete and possibly non-persuasive.
If it rests on the view that segregation in principle is a denial of
equality because choice is not available to a minority group, it involves an inquiry into the motives of a legislature not available to
courts. Furthermore, it is not sound judicial practice to make the
measure of the validity of legislation the way it is interpreted by
those affected by it. At bottom Wechsler believes that state-enforced
segregation involves freedom of association. If this freedom is denied
by segregation, it is equally compelled by integration. In either case
it works a hardship and involves "human claims of high dimension."
In spite of his criticism, however, Mr. Wechsler believes that these
cases "have the best chance of making an enduring contribution to
'8
the quality of our society of any ... in recent years.
II
In his recent book Mr. Charles P. Curtis also builds his argument
around the Hand lectures of 1958. Recalling Hand's inability, putting
aside any kind of Natural Law, "to frame any definition that will explain when the Court will assume the role of a third legislative
chamber and when it will limit its authority to keeping Congress
8. Professor Louis H. Pollak of the Yale University Law School has written
an article by way of reply to Professor Wechsler, which appeared in the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review for November 1959. He picks no
quarrel with Wechsler over the basis or scope of judicial review nor over the
desirability of general and neutral standards to characterize its use and mark
its limits. Nor does Pollak take issue with the Wechsler view that the Court
may properly be criticized for summarily disposing of important and difficult
questions "via the inscrutable per curiam." He does take issue over the problem of whether or not the white primary, the restrictive covenant and the
segregation cases are based on neutral and reasonable principles capable of
further application and entitled to respect by virtue of their inherent judicial
worth. The doubts that worry Wechsler do not plague Professor Pollak, and
he undertakes to defend the decisions as grounded on reasonable, neutral and
general principles of judicial integrity.
At the very beginning one suspects, though, that there is a vast difference
between the two writers in attitude and approach to law. For Wechsler
judicial activity is apparently regulated by reason; for Pollak, by will. Consequently, there is too often no real meeting of the minds of the two men in
respect to the matters at issue. Neutrality and principle, one suspects, have
not the same meaning for the two. At any rate, Professor Pollak is hard put
to frame a mentally satisfying standard for determining what the Court will
declare to be state action proscribed by the fourteenth amendment.
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and the States within their accredited authority," Curtis sets himself
the task of satisfying himself as to whether he can succeed where
Hand has failed. Discarding as unrealistic the idea of self-limitation,
he can find no principle, no definition, except by falling back upon
natural law-a new natural law, a natural law for today. Says Curtis:
I am proposing a Natural Law for Today, not a revival of the natural
law that Hand rejected, neither that of the Church and St. Thomas
Aquinas nor that of the Enlightenment and Thomas Jefferson. I want
to propose a version of natural law that is both modern and mundane...
[that] is made up of those fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which Justice Benjamin Cardozo said were 'deeply rooted in reason and
in the compelling traditions of the legal profession .

.

. implicit in the

concept of ordered liberty.' Professor Lon Fuller goes deeper and calls
it 'the fundamental rules that make law itself possible.' Judge Charles
E. Wyzanski, Jr., thinks of it as 'a set of basic premises,' 'a core of values,'
such as are 'characteristic of our particular civilization.' Professor Benjamin F. Wright uses the word consensus. Walter Lippmann is convinced
that there is 'a body of positive principles and precepts which a good
citizen cannot deny or ignore' and calls it 'The Public Philosophy.' But
definitions are but road signs. They tell you which way to go, and at
the same time how far distant you are from the City of Understanding.
All we need to know at the beginning is what the author is going to
talk about. By the time we get through no definition ought to be necessary.
The two I like best, one plain and the other fancy, are these:
Take the plain one first. It is in John Dewey's little book, The Living
Thoughts of Thomas Jefferson (David McKay, 1940).
'Jefferson used the language of the time in his assertion of "natural
rights" upon which governments are based and which they must observe
if they are to have legitimate authority. What is not now so plain is that
the word moral can be substituted for natural whenever Jefferson used
the latter in connection with law and rights, not only without changing
his meaning but making it clearer to a modern reader. Not only does he
say: "I am convinced man has no natural right in opposition to his social
duties," and that "man was destined for society," but also that "questions
of natural right are triable by their conformity with the moral sense and
reason of man."'
The other, which is on the fancy side, comes from another great philosopher, Alfred North Whitehead.
'My own belief is that at present the most fruitful, because the most
neglected, starting point is that section of value-theory which we term
aesthetics. Our enjoyment of the values of human art, or of natural
beauty, our horror at the obvious vulgarities and defacements which
force themselves upon us-all these modes of experience are sufficiently
abstracted to be relatively obvious. And yet evidently they disclose the
very meaning of things.
'Habits of thought and sociological habits survive because in some
broad sense they promote aesthetic enjoyment. There is an ultimate
satisfaction to be derived from them. Thus when the pragmatist asks
whether "it works," he is asking whether it issues in aesthetic satisfaction.
The judge of the Supreme Court is giving his decision on the basis of the

19601

BOOK REVIEWS

aesthetic satisfaction of the harmonization of the American Constitution
with the activities of modem America.'

(Science and Philosophy: The

Wisdom Library, 1948, p. 138).
The law is full of this natural law element, this consensus of social
opinion cast in vague generality that calls for prophetic enunciation.
Curtis finds it superbly in the segregation case. Wherever the law
must work by persuasion rather than force, wherever the opinion of
the layman is worth that of the expert, wherever you find large terms
with little meaning, you have natural law. The prophets by default
of this natural component in our law are our judges who are little
better equipped by training or temperament or experience to prophesy
than are laymen. Curtis realizes, however, that "it is even more than
desirable, in fact, indispensable, that there be some one to interpret
this natural component of law to us, translate it into speech, lift it
out of the tacit and the implicit, make it articulate." This is what
the Court does when it assumes the role of a third chamber.
Who then shall articulate the consensus, the underlying moral assumption? Who shall render concrete the vague and the general?
Should it be the Court, "an aristocratic enclave"? These are difficult
questions for Curtis as for any fair-minded man reasonably conversant
with our institutional system. Certainly there will always be under
any arrangement, a large and fair domain for judicial activism, for
always it is the task of the judge to apply the general to the particular. It is the protection and support of this indispensable function
that gives concern to Hand, to Curtis and to all those who love the
law. In our system the Court performs two functions. It monitors our
federal system; it keeps each of the departments within its assigned
spheres. This is its necessary function. The other function is to
legislate, to be the prophet of our natural law. The force and effectiveness with which the Court performs its necessary function springs
from its prestige, especially its prestige in Congress. This respect and
prestige is invaluable. Without it the Court could neither monitor
fairly and successfully the federal system nor legislate, as it must
sometimes do, by Congressional default. Therefore, Curtis believes:
So long as the Court permits itself, or Congress permits the Court, to
legislate so freely on controversial subjects and with such an air of
finality, the Court's prestige and authority are expended and hazarded
for a purpose that may be useful but is certainly not necessary, the
less well and the less effectively will the Court be able to exercise its
indispensable function.

In the final analysis he must agree with Hand: the Court is not
acceptable as the prophet of our natural law. Very reluctantly, he
admits that "our natural law must take its chances without a national

prophet."
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What Curtis suggests is that Congress assume its proper responsi-

bility for legislation; that Congress by a process of definition "bit by
bit reduce the area in which the Court is now left to its own devices."
Then the Court could become a true court of law once again, interesting itself in the "mere interests of the litigants," and leave to other

departments more responsible and amenable to public opinion the
duty of solving the delicate problem of the public interest.
The Court has indeed become, however, a third legislative chamber.
A fair-minded man cannot deny this., But has this come about as a
coup de main, as Hand suggests? No, argues Curtis, "the Court is
absolved of its seizure of legislative power for the same reason Jonathan Wild so narrowly escaped being guilty of rape '. . . he in a few
minutes ravished this fair creature or at least would have ravished
her, if she had not, by a timely compliance, prevented him.'"
This Congressional compliance is most noticeable in the application
by the courts to the states of the fourteenth amendment. The amendment clearly places upon Congress the power and duty of spelling out
in clear terms its meaning. But Congress has been either unwilling or
unable to perform this function. By default, historically the burden
has been assumed by a willing Court. Furthermore, Congress has
the power to overrule the Court, recall its decisions, and limit its
jurisdictions. This it has not done.
On this issue Curtis makes a tight case. He does neglect to consider, however, that the inaction of Congress has often resulted from
its inability to find a suitable compromise that could command the
necessary support. If the representatives of the people have been
unable to act, surely this very inaction spells out a lack of consensus
in a wide and sectionalized land. May not inaction and temporary
repose actually represent the only valid consensus in a system that
puts great premium upon persuasion of minorities and respects the
virtues of slow change? Under such conditions, one may ask, is it not
a coup de main for the Court to make law in an area left by specific
constitutional mandate to the Congress and for the very reason that
our system is a federal system?
III
Both Professor Wechsler and Mr. Curtis have set sail from a headland chartered by Learned Hand. Wechsler disagrees with Hand on
the basis of judicial review. He would not have.judges abstain from
those "basic conflicts of right and wrong," 9 from those delicate decisions that determine policy. For him the limits of judicial activity
are marked rather by the requirement for principled and neutral
9. HAND,

SPIRIT OF LIBERTY

164 (1952).
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decisions. When these cannot be articulated, judges should abstain.
Curtis, to the contrary, agrees with Hand. The judicial function is
too valuable to be jeopardized by the heat and clash of opposed political forces. Even more compelling is the fact that our system devolves upon representative assemblies the duty of articulating the
national will. Here the political process is free and flexible; here
all interests may find expression, and the balance which is thus
achieved is a true and democratic balance.
ROBERT S. LANCASTER*

CASES AMD MATERIALS ON JURISPRUDENCE. By John C. H. Wu. St.
Paul: West Publishing Co. 1960. Pp. xliii, 719. $12.00.
Professor Wu of Seton Hall University has compiled a casebook
whose structure arises out of the definition of law of St. Thomas
Aquinas. A free translation of this definition describes law as "an
ordinance of reason made and promulgated for the common good by
him who is charged with the care of the community."' The author
points out that this definition contains "four elements equally indispensable to the notion of law, namely, reason, authority, the
common good and promulgation. '2 Turning Aristotelian for a moment, Wu remarks that these four elements represent the four types
of causes:

Reason is the formal cause of law, authority the efficient cause, common
good the final cause, and promulgation the material cause. The existence
and binding force of a law depends upon the convergence of all these
causes.3
The first three hundred pages of this text expand upon Thomas'
definition. Since this symposium issue already contains a study of
the legal philosophy of Aquinas, no exposition of these elements will
be essayed, except to say that they are here exemplified under the
titles of The Principle of Rationality, of Teleology, of Authority, and
of Shared Knowledge.
Chapter 5 is devoted to the principle of Adaptation which describes
how the law grows and remains flexible. This section is a bridge
between the working out of the meaning of law and the true love
* Dean, University of the South, Sewanee, Tennessee.
1. AQUINAS, SmrmMA THEOLOGICA
lation. Wu, CASES AND MATERIALS
cited as JURISPRUDENCE].
2. JURISPRUDENCE 225.

3. Ibid.

I, HI, Q. 90, art. 4. Wu cites a variant transON JURISPRUDENCE 209 (1960) [hereinafter
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of Dr. Wu-justice. 4 In this section are the cases and the comments
on what Cardozo called: "The reconciliation of the irreconcilable, the
merger of antitheses, the synthesis of opposites." 5
Law and Morals are taken up next and are discussed in accordance
with the first principle of natural law that good is to be pursued and
done and evil is to be avoided. 6 This principle had been previously
particularized by Ulpian with directions "to live honorably, not to
injure another, and to render each one his due."'7 The author uses
these specifics as the basis of his demonstration of the interrelations
between morals and law.
Next follows a chapter describing the impact of morality on the
law governing economic relations. The general theme is the continuing development of the concept of fairness. The stage is now set
and the next one hundred pages discuss justice.
The tradition followed by the author stems from Justinian through
Bracton wherein justice is "the constant and perpetual purpose to
render to each and every one his due."8 This appears to base justice
on will, but Judge Wu insists that behind every act of the will is an
intelligent judgment. Accordingly, he asserts: "Justice has the true
for its basis, the good for its orientation, and the beautiful for its
quality. It has, thus, three constituent elements, the rational, the
teleological, and the aesthetical, all three being rooted in Reality."
Having considered the teleological aspect of law earlier in the book,
Wu now presents some subjective features of justice which he entitles "The Mind and the Heart." He quotes Justice Johnson to the
effect that the work of a court must be directed by the head and not
by the heart. 10 To show his doubts about the force of this principle,
Professor Wu includes a lengthy extract from his earlier book, The
Fountain of Justice, in which he argues that technicalities in judicial decision frequently arise from a head unprompted by the love
of justice which "is the sole purpose of law."" He had earlier noted
that there were "two fundamentally different types of judicial minds,
one type hungering after certainty and uniformity of the judicial
order, the other thirsting after justice and equity in the particular
4. "Jurisprudence is . .. the science of justice." JURISPRUDENCE 18.
5. CARDOZO, PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 4-5 (1928) quoted in Wu, JunisPRUDENCE 298.
6. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, II, Q. 94, art. 2. "The first principle of
natural law, it is said, is 'Seek the good and avoid evil' . . . . I can think of
no legal or legislative problem of American law in my lifetime that would be
appreciably advanced toward a satisfactory determination by invoking this

formula." Patterson, A PragmatistLooks at Natural Law and Natural Rights,
in

NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 55 (Harding ed. 1955).
7. JURISPRUDENCE 317.
8. Id. at 446.
9. Id. at 448.
10. The Rapid, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 155 (1814), quoted in JURISPRUDENCE 448,
11. Id. at 455.
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cases before them."'12 He confesses to inclining to the latter type,
but naturally does not believe that any judge must be one or the
other. All he asks is that, within the required limits of stability, the
judge opt justice.
There isn't any sense of history exhibited in this book. There are
no suggestions of periods of strict law, as for Dean Pound, followed
by a period of growth. This latter type of historical approach would
give a more meaningful explanation of variations in judicial results
than the figurative heart and head approach. At this point in the
book, there should have been some explanation of the other values
that the law may seek in addition to consistency and stability. And
when there are assorted values possible, which is the heart and which
is the head?
The author next devotes an entire chapter to examples of five kinds
of justice: personal, commutative, distributive, public, and social. Personal justice includes retributive justice. Some discussion of the
theories of punishment would have been appropriate at this point,
but Mr. Wu, in his preface, admitted that he was not including
"some of the burning problems of the criminal law."
The volume next includes short chapters on legal concepts and
legal method, and concludes with what seems a most important one
to the author-Law and Religion. The great constitutional principle
of the separation of the Church and State does not go counter to
the undeniable historical fact of the immense and continuing influence of Christianity upon the development of the common law.
This influence is demonstrated by examples from a great variety of
sources.
This book sets forth the evidence to support arguments in favor of
one particular school of jurisprudence. The work exhibits what appear
to be the source materials for Professor Wu's earlier book, The Fountain of Justice, which enjoyed a most enthusiastic reception upon its
publication in 1955. The execution of the work is almost devoid of
polemics. There are a few references to the false assumptions of such
as the positivists, but the allusions are mild and nobody could possibly
take offense. This charity, however characteristic of the author, is, as
will be discussed, probably the main complaint to be registered
against the book. Before considering the use of the volume as a
textbook, a semantic problem that pervades the work should be noted.
The words "natural rights" and "natural justice" are not magical.
They have variant meanings given by time and place. Any American
judge in the first half of the nineteenth century, talking about natural justice, was more likely to have had Locke and Rousseau in
12. Id. at 3.
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mind than Aquinas. And this natural justice led to that extreme
individualism that Dean Pound has described so well and from which
we are reacting so thoroughly.13 While particular meanings are attached to these words by the author, it is not clear that the quoted
passages are examples of these meanings. This is a common problem
with respect to the invocation of natural law or natural justice. In
the present work the practice of the author is to state the facts in a
case and then quote extensively from the principles announced in
the opinion. It is surprising in how many instances a reader cannot
guess what was the result of the application of these principles.
Dean Pound has commented on how frequently resort to natural
justice leads to the legal rules already in effect in the particular
14
writer's jurisdiction.
Aquinas' definition of law with its elements of reason, common
good, authority, and promulgation, without further explanation, is
applicable to almost anything that Cardozo or Pound ever said about
the law. They can hardly be classified as Thomists. To make clear
the distinction between Mr. Wu's views and those of the sociological
jurisprudents would require extended discussion of the premises implicit in the two schools. For instance, the author points out on
several occasions that Aquinas claimed that the positive law should
"further the common weal" (saluti proficiat) and that the particular
determinations of how this may be done "depends on certain circumstances . . . adapted to place and time" (loco temporique conveniens).15 Wu adds "that these particular determinations should be
revised from time to time so as to keep abreast of the advancing
civilization of man."'1 6 Cardozo also would argue that the law must
adapt itself to social needs.' 7 While these two statements appear to
say the same thing, there must be more to Thomistic legal philosophy
than Cardozo's social needs. The current dispute over birth control
appears to be an example in which these two legal philosophies would
reach different results. Wu does not make it clear how he would
argue in such a case to demonstrate the greater adequacy of the
Thomistic view.
13. These thoughts are not new to Professor Wu. He has remarked: '"When
one remembers how the term 'natural law' was being bandied about so freely,
with a view to lending a cosmic sanction to all kinds of silly ideas, one can
understand why jurists of strong moral intuitions became so hostile to any
mention of the natural law." Wu, THE FOUNTAIN OF JUSTICE 134 (1955).
14. For the philosophers, see COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMs AND LEGAL IDEALS 107
(1959); for the jurists, see POUND, THE IDEAL ELEMENT IN LAW 63 (Calcutta
1958).
15. AQUINAS, SUMmA THEOLOGICA I, II, Q. 95, art. 3.
16. JURISPRUDENCE 216.

17. "Sooner or later, if the demands of social utility are sufficiently urgent,
if the operation of an existing rule is sufficiently productive of hardship or
inconvenience, utility will tend to triumph."
LAw 117 (1924).
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The above are reservations to the book on its merits, but a wider
and equally interesting problem is how to evaluate the work as a
textbook in a course on jurisprudence. There isn't any doubt but
that the volume should be popular in Catholic law schools. But it
would appear to have drawbacks even for use in those schools. The
main objections to the book are: (1) it describes rather than argues
its themes, (2) it is not deep enough in the exposition of its own
thesis, and (3) it does not provide enough material concerning other
approaches to the field of jurisprudence.
Really to understand many of Professor Wu's arguments, a student
would have to bring with him some learning in Thomistic philosophy.
Without such a background, he would hardly be able to evaluate
many of Wu's contentions which, as will be seen, frequently go
counter to principles usually held by one trained in a modern
empirical philosophy.
In view of these assertions, it might be of interest to examine why
it makes such a difference to anyone that there is a particular theoretical bias in a book. It should be agreed that law is not an end in
itself, but a means to an end. Law is but one of the sciences, a practical one at that. It draws its fundamental premises from a higher
source, that of philosophy. Justice Cardozo has said that "implicit
in every decision where the question is, so to speak, at large, is a
philosophy of the origin and aim of law, a philosophy which however
veiled, is in truth the final arbiter."' 8 Professor Wu agrees with this
view. He has said that "there is no other way of teaching law except
in the grand manner, for the simple reason that one cannot really
know the law without taking account of its sources."'19 Not only cannot
law be fully understood without an understanding of the metaphysical
assumptions involved in the particular rules or principles at issue,
but, even more pointedly, the decline in schools of jurisprudence
has been attributed to their failure to provide the materials for such
an understanding."
Professor Wu makes no suggestion that his writings have any
18. Id. at 22, quoted

in Wu, THE FOUNTAIN OF JUSTICE 6 (1955).
19. Wu, THE FOUNTAIN OF JUSTICE 5 (1955). He also quotes from his friend,
Dean Miriam Rooney of Seton Hall University: "To understand law better, a

fuller knowledge of logic would doubtless be desirable, but to understand

both law and logic better, a greater knowledge of metaphysics is needed above
all." JURISPRUDENCE 39 n.3.

20. "[Ijnterest in analytical jurisprudence has sharply declined since 1930.

...There is a clue to the actual cause, namely, the predominant interest in
this half-century in an empirical science of law and, in the past decade, in
the ethics of law. These interests require a congruent conceptual apparatus
or 'ontology'; and it is probable that the decline of analytical jurisprudence is
due to its failure to provide such a set of ideas." HALL, STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND CRIMINAL THEORY 135-36 (1958).

Hohfeld, see Id. at 32-33.
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limited application. But since he agrees that metaphysics is basic
here, some of his ontological views on particular points of fundamental import should be noted. A good example appears in the
author's conception of law. Professor Wu asserts that a principle of
law can have an "objective reality outside the mind" and an "otherness distinct from the thinking subject." 21 This philosophical realism
obviously makes possible concepts of law that are not conceivable for
a student trained in a naturalistic metaphysics or epistemology. At
once, for example, the problem of the existence of natural law presents little difficulty to a Thomist, but would baffle or be unacceptable
to a thorough-going empiricist. The author also talks of "immutable
principles of law."2 The average reader of this essay would be hard
put to name one such principle.
A second example to note is the theistic character of Wu's natural
law. According to St. Thomas, eternal law is that by which God, the
ruler of the Universe, rules the world.23 Natural law is the participation in the eternal law by the rational creatures of the earth.24 By
the application of the precepts of natural law, the human reason
proceeds to make particular determinations. These particular determinations are human or positive law.2 5 Professor Wu sums this
up by saying: "the eternal law, the natural law, and human law form
a continuous series. The whole series may be compared to a tree,
with the eternal law for its root, the natural law for its trunk, and
the different systems of human law for its branches." 26 This description illumines the remark of Dean Miriam Rooney that "the natural
law undertakes to recognize and describe ... the observable relation
existing between all creation and the Creator, between creatures and
God. 12 7 It may be inferred that the bias of this book is theistic and,
more particularly, also Catholic and Thomistic.
A third aspect of Professor Wu's philosophy which might well present problems to a non-Catholic lies in his value theory. It has been
previously noted how, for the author, justice is an amalgam of the
true, the good, and the beautiful. This is because the "universal
principles of justice are derived from the Supreme Being, and therefore are true as well as good."2 The aesthetic qualities of justice
are a function of clarity and proportion, but note that according to
Mr. Wu: "The ultimate source of beauty lies in the supreme Harmony
21. JURISPRUDENCE 39.

22. Id. at 14.

23. AQUINAS, SuMMA THEOLOGICA I, II,

24. Id. at Q. 91, art. 2.

25. Id. at Q. 91, art. 3.

26. JURISPRUDENCE 219.

27. Id. at 677.

28.

JURISPRUDENCE

36.

Q.

91, art. 1.
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of the Holy Trinity." 9 Clearly the full import of such a theory of
justice requires a workable background of theology.
These special arguments over the nature of reality, religion, and
ethics as set forth by Professor Wu are intended to demonstrate that,
if a jurisprudence must fit into some metaphysical position, whether
or not articulated, then a student using this book without a specialized
philosophical training will have trouble. This sort of background
should be brought into the law course. The undergraduate training
is normally all a student brings with him to law school. Accordingly,
it does not seem unfair to express the opinion that only the student
trained in a Catholic undergraduate college would acquire the necessary scholarly background to use this book with the fullest understanding.
With this special outlook which this review has probably
overstressed, the student would no doubt enjoy this text. But he
would not learn much about other schools of jurisprudence, not even
about other natural law schools. For example, John Austin is mainly
represented by an extract from an article by Albert Kocourek about
Austin.3° The countervailing material isn't here unless it be gathered
from a maximum use of the fine bibliography included by the author.
These difficulties are raised because they are present. The instructor
will have to make his own choice. But there is one use for which
this book is specially adapted. It is a real tool with which to combat
the average student's obsession with the practical aspects of what he
knows as The Law. The practical-minded student will be impressed
with the fact that so much of the material in this volume comes from
cases. These are judges talking! And the cases used here uniformly
sound as though the words were truly coming from the heart. Such
students may even feel that a streak of anarchy is running through all
this material. For this very reason, this book could contribute to
loosening the hold that the "rules" have on so many students and in
providing a flexibility of outlook that will benefit both their future
clients and the growing society in which they will practice their
profession.
STANLEY D. RosE*
29. Wu, THE FoUNTAiN or JUSTICE 255 (1955).

30.

JURISPRUDENCE

168 passim.

* Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
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THE LAW AND LEGAL THEORY OF THE GREEKS: AN INTRODUCTION. By J.
Walter Jones. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. Pp. x,
327. $6.75.
The Provost of Queen's College, Oxford, has isolated ancient Greek
law for a separate detailed treatment. It is an extremely welcome
contribution to legal science. Similar studies have been attempted
very seldom in English or by continent scholars. Since Greek legal
ideas were peculiarly conditioned by life in the city-state, the author
has examined Hellenic law as part of the thought that emerged in
the development of Greek civilization and political life. Seventeen
chapters take up among other topics the function of law, law and
nature, sacral law, marriage, ownership and possession, contract,
mortgages and leases, and the later influence of Greek law. The
chapters are descriptive and free from polemic instead of controversial. The result is an essential work of reference for students of
history, of classical philology, and of the field of law, based on an
impressive command of the primary sources and of the modern
scholarship relating to ancient law and legal theory.
The author has dealt excellently with the reasoning about law in
philosophy and the parallel speculation in poetry and drama; and he
has examined very perceptively ex parte statements of litigants or
counsel in extant legal orations. His discussion rests mainly on
acknowledged literary works of the classical period. The classical
law of Athens predominates, though hundreds of city-states made
up the Hellenic world and the law outside of Athens awaits comprehensive treatment.' The surviving works of literature favor
that orientation, but it is a limitation that Greek law naturally
transcends.
Greek legal reasoning can also be inferred from the actual practices of the Hellenic states as well as from the nascent theory about
law. Presuppositions and practical solutions in legal matters are
evident in the deliberative, administrative, and judicial mechanisms
and procedures adopted by Greeks in various places and at various
times in antiquity. Papyri and inscriptions shed light on those
varieties of legal experience. Besides literature, therefore, the scholar
has available for his scrutiny the ipsissima verba of lawgivers and
statesmen, city-state and league records, marriage contracts, wills,
petitions, receipts, and other documents. New ground could be broken
by a comparative and collective study of the diverse and scattered
1. BONNER & SMITH, THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE FROM HOMER TO ARIsTOTLE (2 vols. 1930, 1938) was to have had a third volume dealing with other

Greek legal systems. The additions have appeared in learned journals and
are not coextensive chronologically and geographically with Provost Jones'
investigation.
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material outside literature proper bearing on legal science. But more
cannot be required from an author than he has set out to do. Provost
Jones in his subtitle sets some bounds for his undertaking, while
allowing himself a wide scope and not at all eschewing excellence.
2
The reviews of this book with good reason have been favorable.
The following remarks about particular points are not intended to
detract from its intrinsic merits. Some additional references may be
useful for prospective readers.
The ancient Greek world presents the scholar with the contrasting
subjects of legal philosophy, history of law, legislation, international
organization, and comparative law for study. The author has not
chosen to deal specifically with international law. Strange to say,
no philosopher of the great age of Greece has thoroughly considered
the foreign affairs of his or any other city-state, though the problem
was urgent. The historian Thucydides and the orator Demosthenes
can be read with great profit about the vicissitudes experienced by
the states of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. Advances continue to
be made in understanding the relations among the individual citystates of antiquity.
To the discussion on page 5 of the quotation from Simonides "the
city is a teacher of men" (Diehl, fr. 53) can be added a reference to
G. Smith, ]IOAI ANAPA AIAANKEI, 38 ClassicalJournal261-79 (1943).
The cTWpOVM-Ta are mentioned on page 6. S. Dow, OI IIEPI TO
AiOrENErON, 63 HarvardStudies in ClassicalPhilosophy423-36 (1958)
again takes up the education administered under the ephebia in order
to settle a question relating to those officials. Plato's dissatisfaction
with legislators is cited on page 7. It was not unique, though his
generalization received immortality. Demosthenes was aware of the
imperfections of the professionals (of 7oXtreCI~vot). The virulence of
Plato's a priori condemnation of democracy is in marked contrast
to the tenacity with which Athenian institutions persisted after his
death. The innumerable preserved records supplement and modify
the impression gained only from philosophical theory. Athens, which
continued to use familiar machinery of government with occasional
modifications until the time of Sulla, demonstrated the efficacy of
its political heritage. For "stringest" on page 9 read "stringent."
Discussion of the medical metaphor of political health (p. 17 passim)
can also cite Demosthenes, Second Olynthiac 14. "Free and slave"
(p. 57 passim) is sound; other scholars often exaggerate the place of
slaves in Greek industrial and economic life. Isonomia (p. 85), a
2. Campbell, Book Review, 72 CLASSICAL REv. 165 (1958); Dorjahn, Book
CLASSICAL J. 334 (1958); Harrison, Book Review, 78 J. OF HELLE mc
STUDIES 167 (1958); Pritchett, Book Review, 63 A1vimcAN HISTORiCAL REV.

Review, 53
378 (1958).
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democratic watchword and principle, commonly implied equal rights
for all free-born native adult males in public life and private law.
Political and legal equality were not always inseparable. The historical papyrus uncovered at Oxyrhynchus in Egypt enables a comparison of political institutions. In Boeotia participation in sovereign
assemblies of the league was limited to citizens of the middle and
upper classes without giving them any rights under private law which
all free-born native adults did not also have. Athens adopted that
form of isonomia for a brief time in 411 B.C., but the innovation was
never repeated there. J. A. 0. Larsen, Representative Government in
Greek and Roman History 14 (1955), discusses the origin of democratic theory and democratic government, citing his own articles and
those of Ehrenberg and Vlastos. Now also add J. H. Oliver, Demokratia, the Gods, and the Free World (1960). S. Dow, "The Law
Codes of Athens," Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society lxxi 1-36 (1953-1957) can now be added to the bibliography of
chapter V: "The Sacral Law." An article on the orgeones published
by the late W. S. Ferguson in the Harvard Theological Review is
cited on page 162. Readers will wish to know that Professor Ferguson
amplified his remarks in "Orgeonika," Hesperia: Supplement VII
130-163 (1949). Little could be done in order to punish a killer when
there were no relatives to prosecute the case, Greek law being what
it was. (p. 252) The author has cited Pseudo-Demosthenes (xlvii. 6172) for an instance in which the Exegetai, the expounders of sacral
law, sought to dissuade an outsider from prosecuting the killers of
an elderly freedwoman without kin to press the case. In this connection should be cited the cause cdl~bre in the Euthyphro. Euthyphro
was attempting to prosecute his father for bringing about by negligence the death of a slave who was without anyone to initiate a
homicide suit. Burnet, Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, and
Crito 4 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1924) regards the dialogue "as a
valuable historical document, though not quite in the same sense as
the Apology." Euthyphro was so well known that an invented story
about a trial would have vitiated Plato's purpose to demonstrate the
fundamental piety of Socrates.
Perhaps as many as 2,700 ancient and modern items have been
mentioned in the footnotes. An index of passages cited would be
eminently useful and might be considered in preparing a future
edition. The debt of the student of Greek law would be further
compounded.
LLOYD
* Assistant Professor of Classics, Vanderbilt University.
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